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Across Latin America, alliances between politicians and officers are again 
enabling the military to influence politics and policies. In Brazil, President 
Jair Bolsonaro has given a significant share of cabinet seats to current or 
former officers. While some have argued that soldiers may offer the incor-
ruptible expertise needed for solving the region’s pressing problems, Latin 
America’s painful history suggests otherwise.
 • The military is once again stepping into the political arena. Soldiers have been 
granted greater operational autonomy, are being deployed internally, shielded 
from civil persecution, and again holding important cabinet and ministerial 
posts.
 • Although straight-out military regimes are unlikely to occur in the region any 
time soon, Latin America’s history offers a strong warning against the military’s 
expanding political role. Where soldiers gained political influence in the past, 
democratic institutions, civil liberties, and human rights came under pressure.
 • With the region’s structural problems of violence, corruption, and inequality 
unresolved, the demand for drastic solutions have intensified. Citizens and 
politicians alike see in officers the apolitical, incorruptible, and effective policy-
makers capable of solving the region’s most pressing problems.
 • The armed forces for their part have often gladly taken up the offer to enter 
the political arena. In search of purpose and orientation, assuming political 
roles promise the militaries new tasks, more resources, and the opportunity to 
restore lost prestige.
Policy Implications
The case of Brazil shows how swiftly soldiers can regain influence over polit­
ical decisions in democracies. An increasing political role for the military seems 
likely across the region; with it, all the detrimental consequences for political op­
position and civil society groups will ensue. Only if the political considerations of 
both government leaders and military decision makers change will it be possible 
to halt the militarisation of Latin American politics.
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The Military’s Political Return
Across Latin America, the renewed influence of the military over politics can be wit-
nessed. As protests spread across the region in the second half of 2019, presidents 
in Chile, Colombia, and ecuador sent soldiers out onto the streets. ecuador’s Presi-
dent Lenín moreno and Chile’s President Sebastián Piñera appeared on television 
surrounded by soldiers dressed in military fatigues to declare states of emergency. 
Like in Bolivia and Colombia, the deployment of military forces triggered brutal 
crackdowns on social and political activists. What many thought impossible given 
Latin America’s painful past now seems palpable once more: Throughout the re-
gion, government leaders are seeking the political legitimacy and strength of the 
armed forces. The region, it seems, is on the brink of entering a new phase of polit-
ical militarisation. 
In various Latin American countries – including Brazil, ecuador, el Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and mexico – soldiers are currently undertaking police op-
erations against criminal organisations and drug cartels. At the same time, troops 
have been equipped with more legal protection. Like the autocratic government of 
nicolás maduro in Venezuela, democratically elected governments in Brazil and 
Colombia has shifted jurisdiction for serious crimes committed by the armed forces 
from civilian to military courts. In Guatemala, former president Jimmy morales, 
pressured by the military backers within his party, even ended the united nations-
sponsored International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) tasked with inves-
tigating human rights violations by the country’s security forces. In Bolivia, interim 
president Jeanine Áñez even gave soldiers carte blanche to crush domestic protests.
The internal use of the military hints at a deeper change taking place in Latin Amer-
ica: Across the region, officers are again gaining influence over politics and policies. 
In Bolivia, the armed forces played an important role in the resignation of President 
evo morales, which allowed conservative elites to augment their political power. 
The president of el Salvador, nayib Bukele, recently stationed heavily armed sol-
diers and police officers inside the country's legislative assembly to pressure depu-
ties into financing his security plan. In other countries, officers serve as ministers 
Figure 1 
The Military’s Polit­
ical Influence in 
Brazil in Comparison 
to Historical Regimes 
in Latin America, 
1964–2008
Source: Author’s own 
compilation, based on 
own data collection as 
well as on data from 
Geddes, Frantz, and 
Wright 2018 and White 
2017.
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and secretaries, hold positions within government agencies, and advise presidents 
and political leaders. In Brazil, for example, individuals with military experience 
have occupied almost half of all cabinet seats since 2019, including President Jair 
Bolsonaro himself as well as retired army general and current vice president Ham-
ilton mourão (see Figure 1 above). When comparing these numbers to historical 
cabinets in both autocratic and democratic regimes, the unprecedented military 
dominance within Brazil’s current government is clearly visible. Brazil is no ex-
ception, either. In Guatemala, the Association of military Veterans of Guatemala 
(AVemILGuA) founded the party that brought morales to power. Together with 
the country’s old civil–military elites, the association also played a critical role in 
advising the president to eventually abandon the CICIG.
The developments in Brazil, el Salvador, and Guatemala are concerning. The 
mixing of political and military affairs recalls Latin America’s troubled past. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, cabinets were dominated by generals. officers in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala ruled their countries with iron-fist policies that pre-
cluded serious attempts at democratic participation and accountability. The current 
developments are even more worrisome since most experts agree that keeping sol-
diers out of pol itical affairs is a key feature of stable democracies. over the last 30 
years, Latin America’s drive towards democracy would be accompanied by a strong 
reduction of soldiers active in politics (Figure 2). Separating out civil and military 
matters, enhancing civilian oversight, and creating clear channels for command 
and control have been central aspects in the security sector reforms undertaken 
in the region (Pion-Berlin 2009). only the autocratic regimes in Cuba, nicaragua, 
and Venezuela have given their armed forces a continuous say in politics. In these 
regimes, the political roles of soldiers are intended to protect leaders from coups, 
revolutions, or popular uprisings.
For the region’s democracies, the comparison with autocratic regimes highlights 
the risks of granting soldiers political influence. Involving the military in day-to-day 
partisan politics may re-politicise “an institution that Latin Americans spent the 
last generation collectively removing from politics” (Fisher 2019). A deeper look at 
Latin America’s history yields important lessons for better understanding the dan-
gers of employing officers as cabinet members, ministry staff, or political advisers.
Figure 2 
The Military’s His­
torical Influence over 
Politics and Democ­
ratisation in Latin 
America, 1960–2010
Source: Author’s 
own compilation, based 
on data from Geddes, 
Frantz, and Wright 2018 
and White 2017.
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Lessons from Latin America’s Past
recent news reports and op-eds indicate that some commentators are less con-
cerned about the military’s political influence at least. For example, in Brazil the 
“military wing” has been described as the moderate faction within the Bolsonaro 
government. Three-star general Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz and Vice President 
mourão have repeatedly been depicted as the more rational and pragmatic actors 
within the administration, balancing the radical president and his “ideological” 
(Casarões and Flemes 2019) or “conservative” (Stuenkel 2019) faction. Forgotten 
seems to be mourão’s statement that a coup by Brazil’s armed forces may be jus-
tified in certain circumstances. Latin American history offers several examples of 
how the military’s influence over politics can have strong repercussions for demo-
cratic institutions and citizen rights. While full-blown military dictatorships are 
unlikely to occur any time soon, the region’s painful past shows that the soldiers’ 
political influence is often linked to authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights 
violations.
Historically, the involvement of soldiers in politics is a marked feature of autocratic 
regimes. military dictatorships like the ones in Argentina (1976–1983) and Chile 
(1973–1989) had the highest average share of military cabinet members (Figure 3). 
After officers assumed power in such countries, which most did through coups, they 
commonly shut down channels of democratic participation. Free and fair elections 
became the exception, as the military considered itself superior to the questionable, 
volatile preferences of citizens and politicians. Similar thinking also dominated single-
party regimes in Cuba or mexico, as well as personalist regimes too – where political 
power was in the hands of individual leaders like Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela. These regimes also featured comparatively high numbers of 
military personnel in government and allowed only scant political participation and 
accountability. In contrast democracies, which ensure the broad political partici-
pation of citizens through free and fair elections, historically featured the lowest 
participation of the armed forces in politics. And when officers held cabinet seats, 
they commonly served as defence ministers overseeing the armed forces. The politi-
Figure 3 
Military Cabinet 
Members across 
Regime Types in Latin 
America, 1964–2008
Source: Author’s 
own compilation, based 
on data from Geddes, 
Frantz, and Wright 2018 
and White 2017.
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cal representation of the military was hereby often guaranteed by constitutions that 
were remnants of past autocratic regimes themselves (Albertus 2019). Before the 
generals retreated to the barracks, they made sure to preserve the military’s influ-
ence and shield themselves from reform or investigation.
Latin America’s history also shows how soldiers’ heightened political partici-
pation fostered corruption. Autocratic regimes and dictators usually included of-
ficers in cabinet to buy the loyalty of the armed forces. Like maduro in Venezuela 
today, rulers used this form of co-optation to prevent soldiers from staging coups 
or defecting to the opposition. The military, on the other hand, regularly used their 
political weight to increase their involvement in the country’s economic sectors. of-
ficers served as managers in state-owned companies or took up lucrative positions 
as board members. For soldiers, this generated abundant opportunities to enrich 
themselves, forging long-term nepotistic networks between economic and military 
elites like in Argentina (1976–1983) and Guatemala (1963–1986). The corruption 
incentivised economic mismanagement, fuelled the affected countries’ economic 
decline, and increased social inequality.
Finally, countries with a strong military dominance were also more likely to 
adopt iron-fist policies against political opponents and civil society at large. His-
torically, higher shares of military cabinet members correlate with the more wide-
spread abuse of human rights (Figure 4). military-dominated regimes frequently 
deployed military or paramilitary forces against internal opposition groups. Infuri-
ated by political resistance, the security forces targeted whole segments of society 
in the hope of rooting out all forms of dissent. All too often, these heavy-handed 
operations resulted in gross violations of human rights. regimes including the ones 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, and uruguay illegally imprisoned, 
tortured, killed, and made disappear hundreds – in some cases even thousands – of 
individuals.
Taken together, in the course of Latin American history the military’s involvement 
in politics would often be accompanied by the suspension of elections and the ero-
sion of democratic institutions. Where the military gained political weight, the 
economic sector was likely to suffer from mismanagement and corruption. Finally, 
Figure 4 
Military Involve­
ment in Politics and 
Respect of Human 
Rights, 1964–2008
Source: Author’s own 
compilation, based on 
data from Fariss 2019 
and White 2017.
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military-dominated regimes ruthlessly cracked down on political opponents and 
civil society. As a result, citizens saw their civil liberties and their human rights 
violated on a massive scale. This begets the question of why we now again see alli-
ances forming between politicians and military officers in the region. Why do Latin 
American citizens support politicians who make no secret of their plans to pull sol-
diers back into the political arena? And why are soldiers themselves keen to gain 
political influence once more?
Reasons for the Military’s Political Comeback
In the past, military officers assumed political roles through coups. Despite the not-
able exceptions of ecuador (2000), Venezuela (2002), and Honduras (2009), illegal 
power grabs by the military have become rare in the region. nowadays, democrat-
ically elected governments invite soldiers to step into the political arena. As Brazil-
ian four-star general Augusto Heleno explained: “We are fully aware a coup is not 
the way forward. The path will be the next election” (Winter 2019). To make sense 
of this “consultative variant” (mora and Fonseca 2019) of the military’s political 
involvement, it pays to look at Latin America’s unresolved structural problems and 
how they generate the motivation for politicians and soldiers alike to forge alli-
ances.
Why Politicians Increase the Military’s Political Influence
Latin American countries have struggled with economic inequality, corruption, and 
weak democratic institutions for decades now. The election of left-leaning govern-
ments during the so-called pink tide of the first decade of the new century, which 
promised increased political and economic inclusion, generated high hopes for 
structural change. However the modest achievements of these governments, com-
bined with persistent corruption scandals and low economic growth rates, have 
caused growing frustration among large segments of Latin American society. Social 
polarisation and class conflict still persist, feeding into a pervasive security problem 
(Kurtenbach 2019a). events in Chile and ecuador demonstrate how deep economic 
and political frustration run, and indeed how quickly they can destabilise a country.
In recent years, the desire for genuine improvement has led citizens to gravitate 
towards populist agendas (ruth-Lovell 2019). For politicians eager to (re-)win elec-
tions, propagating simple but radical solutions to the region’s problems has become 
a viable political strategy. Politicians and government leaders like Jair Bolsonaro or 
Andrés manuel López obrador brand themselves as figures operating outside the 
realm of the corrupt political class, ones who understand the people’s problems – 
to which they offer real and simple solutions. To give credence to their image and 
political platforms, both political underdogs and ruling presidents have sought the 
political support of soldiers.
Despite its poor historical record as a governing institution, the military still 
enjoys high prestige throughout the Americas. In surveys the military consistently 
ranks among the most trusted institutions, while faith in elections, courts, or the 
police have declined year-on-year (Flores-macías and Zarkin 2019; mora and Fon-
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seca 2019). Soldiers are considered to have integrity, be incorruptible, and to be 
equipped with the skills and determination to get the job done. neither past nor 
current scandals – like, for example, the so-called milicogate case in Chile where 
army offices enriched themselves with a comprehensive kickback scheme – seem to 
have affected this attitude. For most Latin American citizens, the military remains 
a moral authority. Politicians, in turn, hope to utilise the positive perception of the 
armed forces for their own political gain.
Political leaders increasingly rely on soldiers to formulate and implement pol-
icies. Leaning on the armed forces allows government leaders to bolster their own 
legitimacy and, if necessary, bypass democratic institutions. recruiting officers as 
ministers, staff members, or political advisers is seen to demonstrate the politi-
cal willingness and capability to address a country’s intractable problems head on. 
This process is particularly visible in the domain of internal security. While high 
crime numbers are one of the most pressing issues in Latin America, police forces – 
plagued as they are by corruption and a lack of trust among the community – have 
not been able to halt criminal and drug trafficking organisations. mounting public 
pressure for results has led elected civilian governments to turn to the military, de-
spite the dangers of empowering the armed forces with internal duties. In mexico, 
President López obrador – while highly critical of the armed forces at first – has 
tasked officers with the creation of a new, militarised national guard, despite clear 
evidence that such forces are detrimental to security and stability (Flores-macías 
and Zarkin 2019).
For government leaders, there is a particularly strong incentive to benefit from 
the military’s robust standing in times of political crisis. When faced with mounting 
dissatisfaction from among the domestic population, leaders can draw on the mili-
tary to signal that they have soldiers’ political backing. In Latin America, this has 
been exploited by those from across the political spectrum. Left-wing presidents in 
Bolivia, nicaragua, and Venezuela placed officers at the cabinet table so as portray 
“themselves as leaders of a civil-military revolutionary vanguard beset by enemies 
foreign and domestic,” right-wing presidents in Brazil and Guatemala have used 
their militaries “as bulwarks of virtue and safety” (Fisher 2019). Throughout the 
region this has generated a political logic whereby, according to Aníbal Pérez-Liñán 
(Fisher 2019), political leaders who can count on the support of the armed forces 
know that they can defy political rivals as well as protesters in the streets, violate 
human rights, get away with corruption, and still remain in power – even beyond 
the presidential term limit set out in the constitution.
Why Soldiers Want to Influence Politics
In Brazil, soldiers have happily taken up the offer of President Bolsonaro to sit at 
the cabinet table. Latin America’s chequered history also helps us understand why 
militaries have again become willing to forge alliances with political figures. With 
the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of international and inter-
nal conflicts, democratic governments cut military budgets, scaled back the armed 
 forces, and subjected soldiers to increased civilian oversight (Fisher 2019; Pion-
Berlin 2009). moreover, the atrocities of the 1970s stained and internally fractured 
most armed forces – leaving them within a crisis of meaning, and in fear of account-
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ability. Since then, militaries have searched “for purpose; uncertain of their iden-
tity, their mission, and place in society” (mora and Fonseca 2019). Latin American 
officers have sought ways to justify their professional value, salvage their reputa-
tion, and secure sufficient funding.
Being offered posts in cabinets or ministries promises the armed forces a way 
back to past glory. Generals have speculated that being involved in politics will 
demonstrate the virtue of a well-quipped military: a competent helper in times of 
crisis that stabilises the political arena, balances the radical notions of government 
leaders, and skilfully solves the country’s most pressing problems. It also promised 
protection from deeper political and judicial scrutiny. With past crimes by the mili-
tary still remaining unresolved in many Latin American countries, generals have to 
fear that they will eventually face investigation and criminal persecution if they stay 
out of the political arena indefinitely. Against these expectations, taking up political 
roles offers a promising way to preserve the military’s standing while protecting it 
from far-reaching investigation and reform.
overall, the interests of both political leaders and soldiers have generated 
strong motivation for both actors to forge pacts that expand the military’s role into 
politics. The drive for the greater political role of the armed forces carries, how-
ever, the danger that “[e]very cycle of crisis risks heightening perceptions of the 
military as a partisan institution and weakening taboos against its involvement” 
(Fisher 2019). This risk now seems more real than ever, after in December 2019 
the Bolivian military successfully urged morales to quit – potentially establishing a 
precedent for future military interventions in the region.
Slowing Down a New Phase of Militarisation
With comprehensive solutions to the region’s enduring structural problems cur-
rently not in sight, the military’s involvement in politics is likely to only persist. 
Despite this projection, the preceding analysis offers several implications for how 
a new phase of full militarisation in Latin America may at least be slowed down. 
First, a strong motivator for officers to move into politics is the protection of the 
military organisation and their own economic well-being. This implies that soldiers 
will be less likely to adopt political roles if they know that their organisation is well 
funded, their careers are not at risk, and their promotions are free from political 
interference. Securing such benefits may reduce soldiers’ willingness to step into 
the political arena, and could generate political leverage to confine the armed forces 
to their original role.
Second, another potential way to curb the military’s influence is to raise aware-
ness about the dangers of taking up political roles within the armed forces them-
selves. Professional military training has an important role to play here. It may 
reduce the long-term incentives of soldiers to meddle in civilian affairs if it couples 
military professionalism with the virtues of civilian oversight and inculcates offi-
cers with democratic norms. To this end, training needs to be more contextualised 
(Agüero 2019). It must clearly transmit the historical repercussions of military rule 
not only for states and citizens, but also for military organisations themselves. In-
ternational partners may support such depoliticisation efforts by providing foreign 
training programmes that are geared towards this goal.
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Furthermore, with the military deployed on the streets in several Latin Ameri-
can countries, expanding military training on citizens’ civil liberties and human 
rights seems equally paramount. Both domestic and foreign-sponsored training 
programmes commonly include such topics. yet in practice, content often rests on 
the discussion of general and abstract normative concepts while avoiding clear links 
to the military’ own history (Agüero 2019). Teaching historical and contemporary 
developments can help in educating particularly those officers who did not experi-
ence the dictatorships of the past, and therefore may be overly optimistic about the 
military’s enhanced role. 
Finally, analysis suggests that a further militarisation of the region is unlikely 
to be prevented unless the incentive structures for government leaders are changed. 
Given the severity of Latin America’s political and economic problems, this only 
seems feasible in the long run. In the past, international constraints – for ex ample 
under the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the organization of American 
States – have helped to protect democracies from military interference (mora and 
Fonseca 2019). This requires vigilance on the part of the international community 
and, if necessary, the willingness to build up coordinated diplomatic pressure both 
within the Americas as well as between the united States and europe.
However, the chances for such concerted responses currently seem slim. The 
crisis in Venezuela has deepened the political rifts within the organization of Amer-
ican States (Kurtenbach 2019b). The uS as one of the most important actors in the 
region, currently lacks both the political credibility and indeed the will to halt the 
military’s heightened political influence in allied countries. And with China and 
the uS competing for global economic influence, europe’s opportunities to initiate 
a rethink among Latin American government leaders remain limited at best. To-
gether this suggests that a further militarisation of Latin American politics will be 
difficult to curb from the outside. As long as the region’s structural problems of eco-
nomic inequality, weak institutions, corruption, and insecurity remain unresolved, 
the motivation of governments and militaries to include more soldiers in politics is 
likely to prevail.
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